This paper argues that immigration has competing implications for attitudes about government redistribution depending on the level at which immigration is experienced. Working in occupations with higher shares of foreign-born employees can raise individual economic insecurities in ways that might overwhelm the way high foreign-born shares of the population might reduce solidarity or increase fiscal burdens. Hence, experiencing more immigration in one's occupation might more positively affect support for government redistribution than does experiencing more national-level immigration. We test this and other expectations on survey data in 17 European polities, focused on occupational and national measures of immigration. While national-level exposure to foreign-born populations tends to have little effect on support for government redistribution, occupational-level exposure to immigration tends to spur such support. These results suggest that immigration directly influences the politics of inequality, but in ways more complicated than recent scholarship suggests.
Among the most salient issues in contemporary political life involves the consequences of immigration for the social and economic health of receiving countries. Such consequences include welfare states and income redistribution to address economic inequalities. Policymakers, media commentators, and scholars have all developed arguments about how and whether immigration affects social, economic and political relations in ways that could alter welfare and tax systems (Nannestad 2007) . On the one hand, exposure to immigration in one's country and/or workplace might well undermine social capital or solidarity, or might increase the costs of re-distribution efforts, all in ways that might undermine general support for redistribution in industrialized economies (Freeman 1986; Luttmer 2001; Eger 2009 ). On the other hand, such exposure might actually increase substitutability of foreign for domestic labor that can increase subjective risks of income loss or unemployment, risks that might in turn increase rather than decrease support for redistribution as a way to indemnify risks (van Oorschot 2008; Finseraas 2009 ). The evidence marshaled to adjudicate these competing views has been sparse to date, focusing on how national immigration flows or stocks affect social policy spending -assuming more often than exploring the way immigration affects individual or public support for government policies to address redistribution (Senik et.al. 2009 ). The few exceptions, meanwhile, focus on national-aggregate measures of immigration, thereby smoothing-over the substantial variation within countries in how immigration can be expected to influence workers and citizens, and hence their support for social policy and redistribution (Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Finseraas 2009 ). This paper explores how immigration affects social policy by directly investigating support for government redistribution as a function of immigration measured at both national and occupational levels. Immigration varies across, countries, communities within countries, and across occupations and sectors of employment. We expect immigration to have off-setting effects for the politics of redistribution, and to have net effects that vary across levels at which immigration is experienced and measured. At any given level at which immigration is experienced, immigration may erode solidarity and social capital and thereby diminish support for income redistribution, while at the same time increasing individual economic insecurities that may nourish such support. We explain how these offsetting conditions can be expected to play out differently for different levels at which immigration is experienced and measured. For instance, variation in exposure to immigration at the level of occupations captures how immigration can spur individual economic risks but not so much how it affects broad social solidarity or fiscal solvency. But variation in exposure to national-level immigration might well capture the spatial and regional effects of immigration for solidarity and fiscal health while smoothing-over or being distant from individual economic insecurities.
We thus expect immigration measured at the level of the occupation to have more net positive implications for support for redistribution than is the case for national-level measures of immigration.
We empirically test these alternative possibilities on European Social Survey (ESS) data on attitudes towards government redistribution of income in 17 European polities. We focus on two measures of exposure to immigration: individual-level exposure to immigration based on data on the share of foreign-born employees in a respondent's particular occupation; and a country's exposure to foreign-born residents. We find that individual-level exposure to immigration tends to spur support for redistribution, more strongly than any marginal negative effects of national-level exposure to immigration. These results suggest that immigration is relevant to the politics of inequality, but in ways that are more uneven and complicated than we are often led to believe.
Literature and Argument
Immigration always involves people from abroad settling in one's country to live and work. Such immigration varies, and is experienced, across countries and communities, and across occupations and sectors of employment. Whatever the level at which immigration is measured or experienced, intuition and existing research provide reasons to expect immigration in some ways to increase and in other ways to decrease support for redistribution.
Perhaps the most common view is that immigration will tend to be bad news for support for government redistribution, due to plausible economic and social consequences of immigration. The economic consequences are mainly fiscal in nature. Immigrants into European countries tend to be less educated and to perform on standardized tests more poorly than the native population into which they move (OECD 2008; OECD 2009a) . They tend to find employment, further, in sectors in which unemployment waves with cyclical downturns have been hardest hit (OECD 2009a) . Partly because of these characteristics, foreign-born residents have significantly lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than their native counterparts, though in some countries this pattern is reversed. In late 2008 most European countries for which comparable data is available have seen foreign-born unemployment rates that are much higher (9.1 percent) than for the native population (5.7) (OECD 2009a, p.72) . The spread is highest in the Netherlands and Norway (where foreignborn residents are one and a half times more likely to be unemployed than their native counterparts) and smallest in Poland (where native unemployment is ten percent higher than for foreign-born residents).
These socioeconomic characteristics lead quite predictably to higher dependence on many social policy programs and relatively low contributions to the revenue base, such that immigrants are often seen as net fiscal burdens (Gilens 1995; Gilens 1996; Luttmer 2001) .
Immigrants tend to rely less on contributory transfers and services, such as pension and unemployment programs financed through payroll taxes. However, given that immigrants tend to have more children, and to have higher unemployment rates and longer unemployment spells, they tend to rely more than do natives on non-contributory government services and welfare programs -such as social assistance, housing benefits, and public schooling.
According to one recent estimate pooling the experiences of nine EU countries, migrants are 20 percent more likely to rely on such non-contributory benefits (Boeri 2009, p.14) . As for net tax contributions, migrants tend to pay substantially lower share of total revenue than their native counterparts. Boeri (2009) calculates that in nine countries surveyed migrants pay on average only 57 percent of the level proportional to their share of the population -that number being most downward skewed in Nordic countries (30 percent in Finland and Norway) and least in Spain (where immigrants pay slightly more than their share of total revenue (p.13). What this all means for net fiscal burden or contribution is difficult to judge, given the offsetting reliance on contributory and non-contributory programs. Studies have varied substantially in their estimates of such net contributions, though for European countries the majority have found a modest net burden, particularly recently, though mostly less than 1 percent of average national GDP (c.f. Rowthorn 2008; Fehr et.al. 2004 ).
In any event, the end result for opinion is that pluralities of European polities surveyed consider immigrants to contribute less in taxes than they receive in social benefits (47.3 %) and that they are bad for the economy as a whole (38.6%). Hanson et.al (2005) find evidence that such sentiments are related: that the higher costs of immigration in settings where redistributive policies are burdened by immigrants yield lower support for immigration in such settings, compared to those with less generous such policies.
The reality or belief that immigrants pose a net fiscal burden, particularly with respect to skewed dependence on non-contributory social-policy benefits, may stoke concern about the economy and about the economic sustainability of government redistribution in particular.
Hence, more immigration might well tend to lower support for government redistribution, all other things equal, out of concern for the latter's higher net cost or risk under highimmigration conditions.
Separate from such fiscal calculations, immigration might also lower support for government redistribution due to more social implications. There are good reasons to hypothesize, and some empirical evidence, that polities experiencing more immigration tend to experience feelings of difference and interact less with one another, even among their own ethnic or regional group. Such motivate the expectations and findings of some that immigration, particularly that which might constitute ethnic heterogeneity, may lower feelings of solidarity, trust and levels of social capital. This is now a matter of fierce theoretical and empirical debate (c.f. Banting et.al. 2006; Putnam 2007; Hooghe et.al. 2008) . But the possibility that immigration is bad news for solidarity is real. If so, immigration could spell problems for support for government redistribution, since trust and solidarity are significantly positively related to support for redistribution and social policy (van Oorschot and Uunk
2007; Alesina and Glaeser 2004).
In any event, there is also evidence that native groups in Europe tend to see immigrants as less deserving of social benefits and protections than are other groups, such as the elderly, disabled, or the unemployed (van Oorschot 2006; van Oorschot and Uunk 2007) .
Such attitudes imply that increasing immigration could underscore a proportionate rise in the "undeserving," plausibly sapping support for redistribution -particularly should this be combined with disproportionate reliance on social policy as appears common.
Whatever the particular logic, a number of empirical studies suggest a broadly negative link. Soroka et.al. (2006) find aggregate evidence that higher proportions of foreignborn in the population tend to decrease growth in social policy spending. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find that ethnic heterogeneity tends to correlate negatively with support for redistribution. And more directly relevant to our concerns, Mau and Burkhardt (2009) find that European countries with higher foreign-born proportions, and particularly higher nonwestern foreign-born proportions, tend to be less supportive of government redistribution. Finally, other studies considering possible interactions between immigration and host-country attitudes or social policy conditions also paint broadly negative portraits of the social-policy implications of immigration for redistribution (Senik et.al. 2008; Finseraas 2009 There are, however, well established reasons in the literature on international political economy to expect the opposite effect -where immigration spurs rather than constrains support for solidarity and government redistribution (De Beer and Koster 2009; Finseraas 2009 ). These reasons have to do with the well-studied distributional economic consequences of immigration. The Stolper-Samuelson or specific-factor Ricardo-Viner models focused on factor or sector profiles underlying international economic movements expect factor-price equalization to result from migration as well as from goods and capital. It doesn't matter to factor-price equalization if we are talking about trade that moves jobs to people, or about immigration that moves people to jobs. Both should yield factor-price equalization, including convergence of wages and working conditions between the labor markets sending and receiving migrants. In OECD countries where the scarce factor tends to be un and semiskilled workers and the abundant factors skilled workers and capital, the expected consequences of higher immigration should be up-skilling. Such implies higher labor supply of un-and semi-skilled workers and hence lower wages and working conditions, and higher risks of unemployment and income loss among these groups. This implies stronger interest in and support for redistribution to indemnify against such risks for un and semi-skilled workers -but less for skilled workers and capital owners. Such effects, however, are likely to be moderated by the degree to which immigration takes place among countries with similar factor profiles and to the extent that effects on consumer-product prices are skewed to benefit lower income workers (Baker 2007) .
Separate from such effects for levels of labor supply and demand, however, is how immigration, like other faces of globalization, tends to increase elasticity of labor supply and demand -regardless of the relative factor-profiles of sending and receiving countries. And the effects are thus likely to involve increased income and employment insecurities regardless of skill level of the workers in the immigration-receiving countries. These conditions suggest that immigration, like other faces of globalization, might increase insecurities that spur support for government interventions.
In fact, there are reasons to expect immigration to have sharper such effects for support for government redistribution than do other faces of globalization. First and most modestly is that immigration likely affects a broader swath of occupations and sectors than do trade and investment -at least in the short and medium term. Migrants move to jobs in both tradable as well as non-tradable sectors. And their effects for the level and elasticity of labor demand is thereby potentially faster to spread than applies to those faces of globalization whose workings move primarily through tradables. Related to this is that the physical presence of migrants in work places likely leads to stronger, more palpable presence of globalization pressures. This might increase the salience and perception of incumbent workers of the globalization pressures.
Second, as already alluded to above, the migration applying to European countries tends to be of a lower skill profile than the native workers for whom they are substitutes. This is captured, among other ways, by how native populations in European countries have higher overall education on average (lower share of primary and higher percentage of secondary and somewhat higher tertiary education) than applies to their foreign-born populations -more so than in non-European OECD countries (see, e.g., Table 3 .1, OECD, 2008, pp. 82-83) . For instance, the proportion of the working-age foreign-born population with less than upper secondary education averages 35 percent for the EU-25, almost ten percentage points higher than the 25 percent for the native population (OECD 2009, p.128) . Such a skew, moreover, has gotten worse in recent years (Boeri 2009, Table 6, p.18) . These conditions suggest more problems for less-skilled workers, due to the factor price equalization such skewed immigration can unleash. Such skew shows up in studies comparing immigration and trade effects on wages, where the effects of migration on up-skilling and on less-skilled wages to be stronger for migration than for trade (Borjas et al., 1991 (Borjas et al., , 1996 Okkerse, 2008) .
Third, foreign-born workers diminish the capacity to bargain to dampen factor-price equalization. This goes beyond the substitutability of foreign for native workers, or the lower income or longer work-day backgrounds of immigrants. It includes also the possibility that foreign-born employees tend to be harder to organize and easier to pressure for employers than are native workers on the whole. Foreign-born workers tend to be less familiar with regulations and rights, to be in more nonstandard working contracts, to get paid less and come from groups with higher unemployment. And they themselves or their families often have precarious legal positions that may make them somewhat more docile in their dealings with employers. To be sure, we have only modest empirical work on this matter, but there are many anecdotal examples and some research to support this expectation (Newman and Lennon 1995; Camarota 1998) . These conditions lead to a situation where workers put at greater risk by immigration might be handicapped in their attempts to address such risks in workplace bargaining on wages and working conditions. And this likely makes workers turn more readily to the government to provide some external support for income and employment risks -hence greater support for government policies entailing redistribution. Hypotheses negate one another such that higher foreign born tends to have no significant net effect on support for redistribution. At stake for all these hypotheses, in any event, is whether the implications for individual economic risk dominate or are dominated by the implications for solidarity and fiscal burden. For now, we treat this as an empirical rather than theoretical question, at whatever level immigration is measured and experienced.
We do, however, expect that the intervening conditions the competing hypotheses implicate are more or less relevant for a given level at which immigration is experienced. The Compensation Hypothesis (Hypothesis Two) emphasizes how immigration might influence individual economic risks associated with exposure to the competition from immigrants in the workplace. It stands thus to reason that differences in immigration shares across such workplaces within countries will most directly capture the effects underlying that hypothesis:
Even within a country with cross-nationally modest immigration will have variation in foreign-born shares of employment in different occupations or sectors, where possible increased economic insecurities of workers might show up. National-level variation in immigration will do so less, we suspect, because it will tend to smooth over the individual economic effects or in any event be distant from the economic experiences relevant to such insecurities. On the other hand, the possibilities that immigration poses fiscal burdens or diminishes social solidarity are not as likely to be stronger in those occupations with higher foreign-born shares than is true of similar variation across regional or fiscal entities like nation states where fiscal and solidarity conditions are more palpable and politically relevant.
Hence, variation in immigration across occupation-years ought to make Compensation Hypothesis (Two) hold more than does the Efficiency Hypothesis (One), while at the level of the nation the pattern ought to be the opposite (the Efficiency Hypothesis holding more than does the Compensation Hypothesis). The observable implication is quite simple: Higher levels of immigration into a particular occupation ought to increase economic insecurities more, and affect fiscal costs of redistribution and/or diminish social trust and solidarity less, than do higher levels of immigration into a country. Hence our final, synthesizing hypothesis:
Hypothesis Three: Higher-immigration occupations compared to low-immigration occupations should increase support for government redistribution more, or decrease it less, than holds when comparing low-and high-immigration countries.
Survey Evidence in Europe
We test these expectations on a cross-sectional dataset of individual attitudes in Europe, combining the four waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) with fine-grained occupational-level data on immigration from the OECD (ESS 2004 (ESS , 2006 (ESS , 2008 OECD 2009c) . The subset of the resulting dataset comprises countries from between one and four waves of the ESS (in 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008) for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. This dataset is particularly suitable to test the arguments above, because it harbors substantial national and individual variation in support for government redistribution over at least a modest time period, and provides the broadest cross section of countries and individual-economic information to study in detail the consequences of international migration.
Variables
We seek to explain public support for government redistribution of income, something that the ESS data, in all waves, directly surveys. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Government should reduce differences in income" (ESS 4-2008 Appendix A3, Q.B30, p.26). We recoded the answers to scale from 1-5 (1=strongly disagree; 2 somewhat disagree; somewhat agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=somewhat agree; 5=strongly agree).
1 How such redistribution ought to be accomplished is left unstated. Government redistribution in practice occurs via some combination of more or less progressive taxation, including negative income taxes, and the provision of various aspects of the welfare state, including some mix of income transfers or social services. We interpret the question to be addressing the broad principle of redistribution, involving either no practical considerations or considerations of some combination of the specific tax or spend provisions.
The grand mean for Support redistribution for all four waves is 3.82 (standard deviation 1.04), suggesting a significant majority of Europeans supporting government redistribution of income. Union member captures organizational interest that affects redistributive attitudes. And we include a dummy for whether respondents are currently full-time employed.
In addition to these individual-level controls, we also consider occupation-level controls to address the possibility that occupation-level variation in foreign-born employees might be a function of background occupational characteristics. For instance, foreign-born employees may tend to cluster in less protected occupations with high rates of non-standard contracts that themselves foster support for redistribution.
1 To address such possibilities we include two control variables that can be constructed from Eurostat Labour Force Survey data on proportion of temporary workers in occupation and proportion of part-time workers in occupation, respectively, which can be constructed at the one-digit level of ISCO-88 occupational categories for all 17 sample countries and 4 survey years (Eurostat 2011a (Eurostat , 2011b ). More importantly, we also consider dummies for all ten ISCO-88 occupations, capturing the effects of any other unobserved features of occupation that might obscure the influence of occupation-level exposure to immigration.
Finally, for those estimations of the effects of aggregate foreign born in nation we also consider the role of two national-level controls. Ex ante Social spending (as % GDP) helps control for the possibility of diminishing marginal returns to redistribution. And similarly, we consider the effects of ex ante inequality, measured using pre-tax and transfer Inequality via Gini-index scores.
Estimation strategy
We fit two sets of models to consider the three hypotheses. The first focuses on the effects of foreign born in occupation, taking full advantage of the substantial within-country variation. These allow us to include country dummies to capture many otherwise unmeasured differences across national settings that might influence immigration patterns and attitudes towards redistribution. For these models, coefficients are estimated using ordered probit and the standard errors are robust-cluster 'sandwich', clustered by occupation to account for occupation-specific clustering of errors. The second estimator considers not only the withincountry variation across occupations in foreign-born shares but also national-level foreign born shares in nation. Ignoring the multilevel nature of the data violates the assumption of independent errors and can lead to underestimation of the standard errors associated with contextual variables (Steenbergen and Jones 2002) . To address such problems, we fit randomintercept-random-coefficient models, grouped by nation and with nationally-varying and occupation-varying coefficients for the individual-level measure of exposure to immigration.
For both sets of estimations, we consider three specifications: one for the 2002 wave of the ESS data (most closely matching the occupation-level immigration data); one for the (most recent) 2008 wave; and one pooling all four waves (2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008) . In addition to these models, we considered and discuss below a range of sensitivity and robustness tests, as well as tests of possible mechanisms linking immigration to position-taking on redistribution.
Results and Discussion
Table One summarizes the main results. The first three models focus only on the effects of foreign-born in occupation, in three specifications of ordered probit estimation with country dummies. The controls perform broadly in line with expectation. Hence, respondents who are older, female, foreign-born, and union-members tend to be more supportive of government redistribution than their counterparts. And those working in occupations with high proportions of part-time workers and of temporary workers tend also to be more supportive, particularly in models taking account of all four survey waves. And more educated, wealthier, married, and employed respondents tend to be less supportive of redistribution. Year, country and occupational dummies are very highly jointly significant (results not shown).
[ Table One Table One , we can estimate the effects of moving from low to high foreign born occupations, such as comparing attitudes of low-immigration secondary school teachers with those of high-immigration hotel workers. Within a country like Poland, which has the sample's lowest foreign-born as a share of the national population (1.6 percent), such an increase involves going from occupational exposure to .9 percent of foreign-born employees to 4.1 percent, and this predicts a modest increase in the chance of strongly supporting government redistribution: from 31.6 (95-percent confidence interval from 23.7 to 41.5 percent) to 34.3 (25.8 to 43.2 percent). And within a high-immigration country like Luxembourg, the same shift in occupational immigration would involve moving from 3.4 percent to 72 percent foreign-born employees, predicting a slightly stronger increase in strongly supporting redistribution: 15.2 percent chance (from 7 to 25.2 percent) among the (relatively) low-immigration occupations, and 16.6 percent (from 7.2 to 24.7 percent) chance of strongly supporting redistribution. Hence, immigration experienced in one's occupations and in one's nation simply to play out differently with respect to support for redistribution.
This means that immigration has complicated implications for social policy and redistribution. For instance, working as a hotel worker in Luxembourg rather than as a publicschool teacher in Poland involves exposure to immigration that may have contradictory implications for support for redistribution. On the one hand one will be more prone to economic risks and favorable to some compensatory redress by virtue of the occupational status, but the implications for solidarity and fiscal burdens might make one more skeptical about such redress. Since the effects of national-level immigration is so much more modest substantively than those of immigration experienced at the level of occupations, the net pattern constitutes more support for Hypothesis Two than for Hypothesis One. In the present data for the countries and years under investigation, occupation-level immigration tends to be more important and to have a more compensatory effect spurring support for redistribution than does national-level immigration.
These main results, particularly those for Foreign born in occupation, withstand a wide range of sensitivity and robustness tests. We get similar results should we consider particular groupings of countries, with (particularly the occupational-level) results being resistant to exclusion of particular countries (e.g. excluding Greece increases the positive effects of foreign born in occupation). Fluctuating controls or including a larger sample of countries (beyond those for which Foreign born in occupation can be measured) can alter the results for Foreign born in nation -making its effects more negative. The main results for foreign born in occupation, however, are not sensitive to such varying mixes of controls or countries -including industry dummies, despite the high collinearity this presents. The same is true for estimations using alternative specifications of support for government redistribution or of foreign-born exposure, such as ratios of foreign to national employees. And constraining the results by excluding outliers in foreign-born shares, or by focusing on only native respondents, also yields very similar results to those reported in Table One . Interestingly, neither foreign-born in nation nor foreign-born in occupation appear to have significantly differential effects for support for redistribution depending on skills levels, gender or age; the reported direct effects prevail. Furthermore, alternative estimators (probits or logits of binary measures of support for government redistribution) or multinomial logit, or alternative estimations of standard errors, all yield results very similar to those in Table One respondents judge social benefits to put an excessive strain on the economy -a condition that, not surprisingly, strongly negatively influences support for redistribution. We do not report these results, though they are available in Supplemental Appendix One.
Given that these are the attitudes in both theory and empirics to significantly influence support for government redistribution, we explore how and whether foreign-born in occupation and foreign-born in nation influence answers to these same questions. This will help identify the mechanisms underlying the Hypotheses. In line with Hypothesis Three, for instance, we expect particularly occupation-level immigration to spark individual-level economic insecurities, and to do so more strongly so than does national-level immigration.
And we expect occupation-level immigration to spark fewer concerns about broad, national economic conditions, about the effects of immigrants generally, and about fiscal costs of redistribution -less than does national-level immigration. significantly increase sentiment that social benefits put a strain on the economy -something we expected to be the case particularly for foreign-born in nation.
[ Table Two here] Other than this exception, the b o u r g S w e d e n S w i t z e r l a n d B e l g i u m A u s t r i a I r e l a n d F i n l a n d P o l a n d F r a n c e S p a i n H u n g a r y P o r t u g a l G 056 Dependent variable all models: "Government should reduce differences in income", answers recoded to scale from 1-5 (1=strongly disagree; 2 somewhat disagree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=somewhat agree; 5=strongly agree) Models 1-3: Ordered probit coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered over occupations (in parentheses), with design weighting. Cuts and dummies for countries, occupations and years not shown. Models 4-6: Random intercept-random-coefficient maximum likelihood estimation (individuals embedded within occupations, embedded within countries). Standard errors shown in parentheses. Implemented in Stata 10. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table One , except the addition of parameters for subjective employment and income risks: Dependent variable is "Government should reduce differences in income", answers recoded to scale from 1-5; and Ordered probit coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered over occupations (in parentheses), with design weighting. Results for all controls (same as in Table One) , cuts and dummies for countries, occupations and years not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
